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Forward
When I set out to work on this thesis, I planned to research the trade-o↵ be-
tween algorithmic accuracy and transparency in criminal justice. I assumed that the
criminal system was caught between accurately predicting crime, on the one hand,
and requiring algorithms to be simple, explainable, and unbiased on the other. After
significant research, I ended up deeply questioning my own beliefs about criminality,
criminal justice and prisons. Ultimately, I found that one concept I had assumed to
be a central tenet in good criminal treatment - accurate prediction - might be utterly
unsalvageable for criminal policy.
Thus, many of the coming pages are critical, and few are typical for an engineering
thesis. My goal is to leave a bit of what I’ve learned for anyone who might read this.
I also hope to demonstrate that a rigorous, quantitative education can and should
remain socially and politically engaged. We know how to solve problems, so we should
also know how to identify them.
Finally, I want to note that many of the topics I bring up just barely scratch at
the surface of our deeply complex system of criminal punishment. I hope to always
continue discussing, writing and learning in the future.
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Abstract
Risk assessment algorithms in criminal justice put people’s lives at the discretion
of a simple statistical tool. This thesis explores how algorithmic decision-making in
criminal policy can exhibit feedback e↵ects, where disadvantage accumulates among
those deemed ‘high risk’ by the state. Evidence from Philadelphia suggests that risk
– and, by extension, criminality – is not fundamental or in any way exogenous to po-
litical decision-making. A close look at the geographical and demographic properties
of risk calls into question the current practice of prediction in criminal policy. Using
court docket summaries from Philadelphia, we find evidence of a criminogenic e↵ect
of incarceration, even controlling for existing determinants of ‘criminal risk’. With
evidence that criminal treatment can influence future criminal convictions, we explore
the theoretical implications of compounding e↵ects in repeated carceral decisions.
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Part I
Predictions
Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Status Quo
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Chapter 1
Historical Context
William Horton was imprisoned in Massachusetts for first degree murder. Re-
leased for a weekend on furlough in 1986, Horton failed to return and was ultimately
re-arrested after raping a white woman and assaulting her fiance´ (Newburn & Jones,
2005). In 1988, campaigners for presidential nominee George H.W. Bush broadcast
a now notorious TV ad featuring Horton. By including Horton’s mugshot and giving
him the nickname ‘Willie,’ the ad managed to play o↵ racial fears without explicitly
mentioning Horton’s race.1 Bush’s campaign used the story to criticize the Demo-
cratic nominee, Michael Dukakis, who was governor of Massachusetts and had helped
to craft the furlough program that enabled Horton’s misconduct. Despite the fact
that most states allowed the same program (Ried, 1988), and the exceedingly low
chances of behavior like Horton’s, his name was a hit on the campaign trail and his
behavior became a defining issue in the election. Bush’s lead political strategist, Lee
1 The ad is notorious for defining ‘dog-whistle’ politics. It did not explicitly reference William
Horton’s race, but race was undoubtedly relevant to its reception. See (Anderson & Enberg,
1995) and (Hurwitz & Pe✏ey, 2005).
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Atwater, famously said, “By the time we’re finished, they’re going to wonder whether
Willie Horton is Dukakis’s running mate” (Schwartzapfel & Keller, 2015). After being
elected, President Bush in 1989 called for “more jails, more prisons, more courts and
more prosecutors” (Dvorak, 2018), setting the stage for the decades of tough-on-crime
policies that would follow.
Criminality and criminal punishment are messy concepts - they depend heavily
on political and social factors that change over time. Judges, having broad authority
over decisions about sentencing, parole, pretrial detention and bail, are guided by a
number of goals - public safety, humane treatment, retribution, rehabilitation, deter-
rence, and others. As the various and often-conflicting aims of criminal punishment
come in and out of vogue, laws follow. And, as algorithms encroach on an increasing
number of human decisions, engineers encounter the same, entangled mess of conflict-
ing values and historical complexities that judges have to reconcile every day. When
each modeling decision might determine somebody’s freedom, the use of algorithms
in the criminal justice system is necessarily political, and inseparable from social and
historical context.
Algorithmic risk assessment in criminal policy has a surprisingly long history.
The departure from a system reliant solely on professional expertise began in 1928,
when Ernest Burgess developed a tool to predict recidivism in order to aid parole
decisions in Nebraska (Burgess, 1928). A professor of sociology at the University of
Chicago, Burgess used statistical regression techniques to predict violations of parole
(Harcourt, 2014). Students of Burgess and other sociologists began to update and
improve actuarial risk assessment methods, and ultimately developed similar methods
for other judicial decisions like sentencing and bail.
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Following Burgess’s lead, the actuarial methods developed in the following decades
used race as an explicit determinant for treatment. Burgess was obsessively fixated
on the race and national origin of parolees, and how these factors correlated with
recidivism. He found black people and immigrants to be the two most likely groups
to recidivate, and his tool’s adoption in Nebraska used his findings to decline parole
for members of these groups (Harcourt, 2014, 238). The tools developed thereafter
all used information about familial nationality and ethnic origin - even as late as
the 1970s, California developed its “Base/Expectancy Score,” which used race as
one of only four factors to determine criminal risk (Harcourt, 2014, 238). There are
numerous ways to explain why these algorithms included race - sociologists could
have been driven by hateful views of blacks, they could have believed in genetically
determinant theories of criminal behavior, they could have inherited understandings
of racial di↵erence that were widely accepted at the time, or all of the above. But,
regardless of the personal beliefs of individuals, these algorithms were adopted because
they did find statistically significant relationships between race and crime. In the
new, evidence-based generation of risk assessment, theoretical links were deemed
unimportant compared to the simple statistical accuracy of predictive tools (Bonta
& Andrews, 2007, 4). By focusing only on statistical performance, developers of risk
tools encoded and formalized discrimination in a new way.
As theorists and judges began to identify limitations in using demographics and
immutable (‘static’) characteristics for assessing risk, a ‘third generation’2 of risk
assessment tools ushered changes in criminal treatment in the late 1970s and early
1980s. These algorithms, no longer using race as an input, found that the individual
2 The framing of risk assessments in four ‘generations’ is used widely in the literature. The first
generation was characterized by widespread reliance on professional judgment, and the second
generation came with the introduction of actuarial, evidence-based methods. See (Bonta &
Andrews, 2007).
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criminogenic needs of a defendant were important in addition to underlying risk.3
Thus, the factors used in actuarial decisions were called ‘risk-needs factors’4 and in-
cluded information that could change over time - employment status, family status,
peer networks, substance abuse, psychological conditions, and residential location
(Picard-Fritsche et al., 2017). While embracing the possibility that risk can decrease
over time, criminogenic needs are notable because they embed dynamic social desig-
nations within the assessment of risk. The added factors, from employment to mental
health, are themselves reliant on a host of decisions and designations by employers
psychiatrists, landlords, and others. The adoption and evolution of statistical risk as-
sessment therefore did not eradicate human decisions (and their accompanying biases)
from criminal treatment. Quite the opposite; algorithms helped judges synthesize a
whole host of labels that can be socially and historically fraught.
The 1980s saw a shift in public opinion that resulted in tough-on-crime policies.
By this time, the principle of risk was deeply embedded in the public’s understanding
of crime and, as a result, the institutional treatment of criminals. The dynamics
were apparent in the newly popular theory of “Selective Incapacitation” - coined by
criminologists Peter Greenwood and Allan Abrahamse in 1982, the theory discredits
rehabilitation catered to criminogenic needs (Greenwood, Abrahamse, et al., 1982, vii-
viii), and instead emphasizes identifying the highest-risk o↵enders early to minimize
harm to the community. The authors write:
Selective incapacitation is a strategy that attempts to use objective actuarial
evidence to improve the ability of the current system to identify and confine
o↵enders who represent the most serious risk to the community.(Greenwood et
al., 1982, vii)
3 ‘Criminogenic e↵ects’ broadly refer to e↵ects that cause crime. ‘Criminogenic needs’ therefore
refers to aspects of a defendant that may lead to further criminal behavior, without proper
intervention. See, for example, (Wooditch, Tang, & Taxman, 2014).
4 See (Picard-Fritsche, Tallon, Adler, & Reyes, 2017, 5-6).
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Where questions of parole and furlough deal with the treatment of defendants who
are already incarcerated, the theory of selective incapacitation is remarkable because
it advocates crafting sentences (i.e., punishments) from a mere anticipation of future
crime. Like the risk tools in use then and those in use today, incapacitation theory
boasts that it is ‘objective,’ ‘actuarial,’ and based on ‘evidence.’ It downplays its own
harms by marketing itself as simply an improvement to existing processes. And, by
situating former o↵enders as a ‘serious risk to the community,’ it implies that these
people are external to the community and represent a threat that (albeit predictable)
is outside of our control.
Tough-on-crime politics and legislation in the 1980s and 1990s dramatically in-
creased the prison population and disproportionately impacted black communities.
Whereas in the 1930s, black Americans were three times more likely to be incarcer-
ated than whites, in the 1990s they were seven times more likely (Lyons & Pettit,
2011, 258). Tough on crime politics were fueled by (and helped fuel) racial stereo-
types (Hurwitz & Pe✏ey, 1997). And, to this day, black people are more likely to be
searched (Engel & Johnson, 2006), arrested (ACLU, 2015), detained (Arnold, Dobbie,
& Yang, 2018), and incarcerated. The public’s fear of crime was inextricably linked
to race, demonstrated by the success of the Willie Horton ad.
In 1990, another reform came to risk assessment - the principle of ‘responsivity’
was introduced, and virtually every tool developed since them has described itself
as catering to the three principles of risk, needs, and responsivity. Coined by An-
drews et al. (Andrews et al., 1990), responsivity aims to identify treatments that are
more- or less-conducive to an individual defendant. Now, instead of just understand-
ing a defendant’s various risk factors for violating the law, algorithms can identify
which defendants may be able to markedly improve as the result of certain specialized
13
treatments. Importantly, however, the converse is also true: responsivity modeling
may enable courts to identify defendants who are beyond hope in some sense, and
recommend confinement. In other words, responsivity is compatible with and even
complimentary to selective incapacitation, and risk-driven decision making.
The development and refinement of criminal risk - as a concept and as a tool -
is innately tied to historical decisions made by theorists, practitioners, judges and
defendants. When a jurisdiction begins sentencing using a risk assessment tool, the
algorithm’s adoption is contextualized by a long history of judicial decisions that may
not have been ‘objective’ or unbiased. The very notion of criminality is contingent
on historical decisions made by lawmakers and enforcement o cers. As algorithms
have evolved, criminal risk has begun to represent a growing group of designations
and measurements that are not as objective as they may seem: psychiatric disorders,
social characterizations, family structure, living arrangements, employment. None of
these labels are free from historical contingency, bias, and inaccuracy. So when the
state begins to design punishments based on these labels, we need to ask where they
come from, and how they may change over time. When an algorithm evolves from
using ethnicity of father 5 to using criminal history of father,6 we need to carefully
consider how biases may be encoded in seemingly-innocuous pieces of information.
And we need to rigorously scrutinize claims of objectivity and predictive accuracy in
the context of criminal punishment.
5 Burgess’s tools used explicit racial measurements by asking about the ethnicity and national
origin of the defendant’s father. See (Harcourt, 2014).
6 COMPAS risk assessment tool has a section devoted to ‘Family Criminality’ which asks ques-
tions about history of familial arrests and convictions.
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Chapter 2
Framing in the Literature
Machine Learning and Prediction
The advent and preliminary success of machine learning models has led to signifi-
cant speculation and excitement about applications. These algorithms are well-suited
to problems that require prediction of an unknown. In medicine, predictions may
enable treatments that are more equipped to help individual patients. In finance,
predicting default can enable more profitable lending for banks. In education, pre-
dicting student success can inform decisions in curricula, teaching, admissions and
more. The extensive set of unsolved problems in society naturally drives our excite-
ment about innovation. Accordingly, our impulse is to consider some of the most
serious and impactful applications first.
Theorists, policy makers and practitioners have adopted the view that predic-
tive algorithms can aid vital public institutions that persistently under-perform. Jon
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Kleinberg, a leading researcher in machine learning, co-authored a letter (Kleinberg,
Ludwig, Mullainathan, & Obermeyer, 2015) that coins the term ‘prediction policy
problem’. The paper emphasizes that quantitative policy research has focused too
heavily on questions of causal inference, and that predictive algorithms can answer
many important questions in academia and policy. To illustrate what predictive pol-
icy decisions are, Kleinberg et al. use the very simple example of the decision to carry
an umbrella to work. In such a case, the person does not care what actions cause rain,
and instead is only interested in predicting rain. Their claim is that many decision-
making problems may benefit from predictive models that do not necessitate a causal
understanding. Their call for research includes applications in medical testing, edu-
cation, violence prevention, lending practices, and criminal decisions including bail.
Others have similarly encouraged applying available statistical techniques to highly
impactful social and political decisions. Jung et al. in a 2017 paper entitled “Simple
Rules for Complex Decisions” acknowledge that human decisions can be sub-optimal,
and advocate a method they call ‘select-regress-and-round’ (Jung, Concannon, Shro↵,
Goel, & Goldstein, 2017). They use the example of bail decisions to argue that re-
gression methods can greatly improve human decisions. They find that, despite being
simplistic, regression methods are robust to a wide variety of complex decisions; the
implication being that regression methods can often improve decisions even when
they do not precisely model variable relationships.
Practitioners who develop algorithms for criminal justice have naturally joined
the ML excitement. In a practitioner’s guide for COMPAS, a widely used algorithm
developed by Northpointe, Inc.1, the company tries to describe the wide embrace of
1 The company now operates under a parent company called Equivant. In this paper, we solely
refer to the company as Northpointe, to be consistent with current literature on the topic.
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data-driven decision-making:
Statistically based risk/needs assessments have become accepted as established
and valid methods for organizing much of the critical information relevant for
managing o↵enders in correctional settings. Many researchers have concluded
that objective statistical assessments are, in fact, superior to human judgment.
COMPAS is a statistically based risk assessment developed to assess many of
the key risk and needs factors in adult correctional populations and to provide
information to guide placement decisions. (Northpointe, 2015, 1-2)
Sweeping statements about algorithms outperforming human predictions is cited as
evidence for the adoption of algorithmic risk assessments. Similarly, emphasis on
big data and academic research is used to establish the reputation of risk assessment
tools. The Public Safety Assessment (PSA) boasts its data-driven development: “Re-
searchers designed the PSA based on the largest, most diverse set of pretrial records
ever assembled—750,000 cases from nearly 300 jurisdictions. Based on a compre-
hensive analysis of the data, researchers identified the nine factors that best predict
pretrial risk” (Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 2019).
Evidently, people are excited about using algorithms in high-impact fields. But
the question remains: are these algorithms being developed and adopted ethically?
Innovations in highly impactful domains are promising, but also can cut dangerous
corners, or have harmful unintended consequences. When Kleinberg et. al. leap
from a simple example about umbrellas to some of the country’s most complex de-
cisions (in education, prison, medicine) we see a need to reconcile the complexity of
the problem with the narrow scope of a predictive algorithm. Jung et al. actually
advocate a simpler-than-realistic model, solely because the algorithm’s performance
beats humans in predictive accuracy. To deal with a highly complex and impactful
problem like bail or sentencing, researchers are finding themselves needing to simplify
and narrow their focus. People are fitting the problem to the model, instead of fitting
a model to the problem.
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Needs, Responsivity and Clinical Treatment
Departing from the predictive view of algorithmic risk assessment, a few authors
have begun to emphasize causal treatment e↵ects in criminal interventions. In an
article entitled “Beyond Prediction: Big Data for Policy Problems”, Susan Athey
notes that some policy problems must be concerned with values beyond prediction:
It is sometimes important for stakeholders to understand the reason that a
decision has been made . . . Transparency and interpretability considerations
might lead analysts to sacrifice predictive power in favor of simplicity of a model.
Another consideration is fairness, or discrimination. Consumer protection laws
for lending in the United States prohibit practices that discriminate on the basis
of race. Firms might wish to use SML methods to select among job applicants
for interviews; but they might wish to incorporate diversity objectives in the
algorithm, or at least prevent inequities by gender or race.
Athey’s words draw attention to the complexity of policy problems. Goals may not
align with one straight-forward objective and may require hard trade-o↵s. In a sim-
ilar vein, Kleinberg et. al.’s “Algorithmic Fairness” o↵ers a sort-of reconciliatory
approach, claiming that algorithmic prediction is still important to these problems,
but that other objectives can be introduced as constraints after-the-fact: “a pref-
erence for fairness should not change the choice of estimator. Equity preferences
can change how the estimated prediction function is used (such as setting a di↵erent
threshold for di↵erent groups) but the estimated prediction function itself should not
change” (Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan, & Rambachan, 2018, 22-23) This theory
is manifested in Kleinberg’s work in algorithmic bail reform (Kleinberg, Lakkaraju,
Leskovec, Ludwig, & Mullainathan, 2017).
Barbaras et al.’s “Interventions over Predictions: Reframing the Ethical Debate
for Actuarial Risk Assessments” challenges the conventional treatment of risk assess-
ment as a predictive policy problem (Barabas, Dinakar, Ito, Virza, & Zittrain, 2017).
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The paper instead draws attention to the treatment e↵ects of criminal interventions:
“If machine learning is operationalized merely in the service of predicting individ-
ual future crime, then it becomes di cult to break cycles of criminalization that are
driven by the iatrogenic e↵ects of the criminal justice system itself” (Barabas et al.,
2017, 1). Their central claim is that treating risk-assessment as a prediction pol-
icy problem does not actually answer the question of how we may be able to lower
risk in the future: “Predictive risk assessments o↵er little guidance on how to e↵ec-
tively intervene to lower risk” (Barabas et al., 2017, 10). Barbaras et al. point out
an important issue in Kleinberg and others’ assumptions - The attempt to fit risk
assessment into prediction necessarily removes criminogenic and institutional e↵ects
of criminal policy from individual behavior. Treating crime as an exogenous factor
that is predictable-but-uncontrollable leads to a logic of incapacitation and abstention
from any constructive or supportive interventions.
While identifying an important flaw in solely using predictive algorithms in crim-
inal policy, clinical treatment of criminal policy is not a new idea. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s, researchers began to realize that existing actuarial risk-assessment
methods used only static, historical factors about defendants, and did not account
for changes in behavior. After a generation of assessments that solely focused on the
‘risk principle’, algorithms in the 1980s began including information about ‘needs’ as
well- dynamic information that might be linked to criminal behavior. These factors,
summarized into seven ‘major risk/need factors’, are listed below.2
Antisocial personality pattern
Procriminal Attitudes
Social Supports for Crime
Substance Abuse
Family/marital relationships
2 See (Bonta & Andrews, 2007, 6) for a complete descriptions of these factors and their role in
current criminal treatment.
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School/work
Prosocial recreational activities
Here, we see very similar logic to Barbaras et al., that clinical treatment is nec-
essary to cater interventions to individuals based on their propensities to commit
crimes. Notice that this logic is not necessarily incompatible with the risk principal.
What Bonta et al. describe as “Generation Four” algorithms purport to combine risk,
needs, and responsivity to cater ideal criminal treatment to defendants.
Theories that emphasize clinical treatment over predictions still rely on outcomes
to determine interventions. In Barbaras et al.’s paper, the writers advocate what they
see as an alternative to predictive algorithmic risk assessment: “Rather than using
machine learning for prediction, these methods could be used to identify features that
are highly predictive of recidivism, in order to inform hypotheses on interventions (and
their timing) that can then be tested using causal inference.” The distinction between
what they’re critiquing and what they’re defending is quite subtle - instead of “using
machine learning for prediction”, they advocate using the same methods to “identify
features that are highly predictive of recidivism” to inform interventions. Indeed,
treatment methods share assumptions with theories of selective incapacitation that
trace back to the 1980s - that criminal justice policy should anticipate future crimes,
and act in a way that protects society from potentially dangerous people. These
methods assume that outcome variables - namely, recidivism - are objectively and
equitably distributed. They assume that the designation of criminal action itself is
in some way fundamental, and that police o cers, juries, judges, prison guards and
parole o cers do not influence the labelling of people as criminals in problematic
ways. We call these assumptions into question.
20
Bias in Criminal Policy
Given the history of bias in criminal justice, many ethical questions have been
brought to the field of risk assessments. A proposed sentencing tool in PA provoked
public outcry recently because their new sentencing tool proposed using neighbor-
hood as a covariate to assess risk.3 Many have argued that other features act as
a proxy for race, including criminal history.4 People have also spoken against the
proprietary nature of certain algorithms developed by private companies, including
Northpointe’s COMPAS. In perhaps the most high-profile and contentious critique of
a risk-assessment algorithm, ProPublica released a report in 2016 entitled “Machine
Bias: There’s software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s
biased against blacks” (Angwin, Larson, Mattu, & Kirchner, 2016). In it, the authors
analyzed COMPAS’s false positive and false negative classifications among black and
white defendants. They found that black defendants were more likely to be misla-
beled as high-risk, while white defendants were more likely to be mislabeled as low
risk.
Developers of risk assessment algorithms have defended their tools as objective
and unbiased. In a scathing retort to Angwin et al.’s ProPublica article, Northpointe
Inc. published a report that defended the COMPAS tool, and used the same data as
the ProPublica article to establish ‘accuracy equity’ and ‘statistical parity’ (Dieterich,
Mendoza, & Brennan, 2016).
Broadly, developers of risk assessments view these tools as helping to fix the
problems of judicial bias and inconsistency, and often frame risk assessments as just
3 See (Christin, Rosenblat, & Boyd, 2015, 3). See also (Melamed, 2018).
4 See (Harcourt, 2014).
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another source of information for judges. Northpointe describes their COMPAS al-
gorithm for case supervision review as “an objective decision support tool to guide
adjustments in the current supervision level” (Northpointe, 2012).The Laura and
John Arnold Foundation describe the Public Safety Assessment as a way to solve
biases in the system: “Advocacy groups are raising important questions regarding
potential racial bias and racial disparities in the use of risk assessments. It is within
this broader context that pretrial risk assessment can play an important role” (Laura
and John Arnold Foundation, 2019). Finally, Level of Service-Revised (LSI-R) pro-
duces a brochure to sell their algorithms to courts, and in it markets their tool’s
versatility: “Accurately assess any population: Valid and reliable in di↵erent coun-
tries, states, provinces, o↵ender populations, genders, various minority groups, and
settings” (MHS Public Safety, 2019). Words like “objectivity”, “bias”, “accuracy”,
“valid”, and “reliable” are used generously by these sites, and for good reason - an
algorithm that may be biased would not be adopted by courts. But we’re left wonder-
ing what these words mean - in a system that has not seemed to rid itself of unequal
treatment across racial and social lines, what do proponents of algorithms mean when
they call a tool objective or valid?
Central to this question is the definition of fairness and fairness in algorithmic
decision-making. In the ProPublica-Northpointe debate, theorists began to realize
that the two organizations were operating with di↵erent definitions of bias - calibra-
tion, or ‘predictive parity’, ensures that defendants with the same score will have the
same reo↵ense rates regardless of race. More specifically, if we model a defendant’s
recidivism outcome as a binary variable Y 2 {1, 0}, and describe a defendant d using
risk score s(d) and group membership (i.e. race) g(d), then calibration is defined as:5
5 See (Corbett-Davies, Pierson, Feller, Goel, & Huq, 2017, 798).
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P (Y = 1|s(d), g(d)) = P (Y = 1|s(d))
Analyzing the debate between ProPublica and Northpointe Inc. on COMPAS, Klein-
berg et al. found that the two organizations were using di↵erent definitions of fairness,
and had stumbled upon a fundamental trade-o↵ in algorithmic fairness. He finds that
while Northpointe had been demonstrating their tool’s calibration to argue that the
scoring was unbiased, Angwin et al. at ProPublica had been analyzing false positive
and false negative rates. He finds that, except in degenerate cases, an algorithm
cannot guarantee the following three properties:6
• Calibration
• Balance for the negative class, meaning that among defendants who don’t re-
cidivate upon release, the average score is equal across groups.
• Balance for the positive class, meaning that among defendants who do recidivate
upon release, the average score is equal across groups.
This finding has motivated research on inherent trade-o↵s in quantitative notions
of bias. However, neither of these formal definitions fully shield algorithms from
discriminative behavior. Indeed, Kleinberg et al. find that the only way to guarantee
all conditions (A), (B) and (C) above, is to have “perfect prediction.” Why? Say
our scores s(d) are binary and s(d) = 1 corresponds to Y = 1 with probability 1.
In other words, Y = s(d). Then our scores would of course be calibrated, since
P (Y = 1|s(d) = 1) = 1 and P (Y = 1|s(d) = 0) = 0 in all cases, and the group
designation g(d) adds no information, since the score perfectly predicts outcome.
Balance for the positive and negative classes is obvious - the average score for all
6 Kleinberg et al. in (Kleinberg, Mullainathan, & Raghavan, 2016) is largely credited with finding
this inherent conflict. However, the logic in (Corbett-Davies et al., 2017) is easier to follow.
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defendants in the positive class is 1, and the average score for all defendants in the
negative class is 0, regardless of race.
Now suppose that the outcome variable Y is somehow a function of race group
g(d):
Y = f(g(d))
Our assumption here is that something about the label Y is racially mediated. For
example, if police o cers are more likely to search a black man, then black men will
be more likely to be convicted of crimes generally, and therefore recidivism Y would
depend on group designation. Let’s start with a trivial case where black o↵enders
will definitely recidivate, and other o↵enders will never recidivate:
Y = 1{g(d) = black}
In this case, a perfectly predictive algorithm will successfully pass both calibration
and balance tests. Even if the algorithm uses information about peer networks, psy-
chological and social analysis, familial crime history, and financial information - rather
than race explicitly - to develop a perfect racial classifier, there’s still something wrong
with this scenario. Theorists have described the shortcomings of formal definitions of
fairness, and the possibilities that variables can be ‘reconstructed’ through proxies.7
In a similar vein, others have explored the idea that even perfectly unbiased predictive
algorithms, as long as they treat groups di↵erently, may be untenable.8
The formal notions of fairness in algorithmic decision-making highlights a short-
7 An example in public policy and finance is red-lining - using location data as a proxy for race.
See (Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel, & Hannan, 1994) and (Lang & Nakamura, 1993), for example.
Of more relevance to the group of theorists we engage with in this work, see (Lakkaraju,
Kleinberg, Leskovec, Ludwig, & Mullainathan, 2017).
8 Information comes from correspondences with Annette Zimmermann, who has forthcoming
work on this topic. See also (Li, 2019)
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coming in the literature: mathematical notions of fairness are seen as totally distinct
and irrelevant to systemic and historically-contextual notions of unfairness in po-
litical conversations about criminal treatment. Recent worries that risk-assessment
algorithms could encode historical judicial biases are legitimate, and represent a new
challenge to tools like COMPAS that is distinct from the Angwin et al. critique.
That is: not only do predictive inaccuracies challenge the e cacy of COMPAS, but a
far-from-perfect system of labels in the criminal, medical and economic fields question
the objectivity of any data-driven, risk-driven tool for criminal treatment decisions.
Validation and Instantial Experiments
Risk assessment algorithms are developed and then tested for ‘validity’. These ex-
periments, formerly only concerned with predictive validity, now test various potential
biases that algorithms may exhibit in new populations. Validation experiments have
therefore become an important aspect of the risk-assessment development process,
and validity is seen as a necessary requisite for any risk assessment algorithm in use.
What does validity mean?
While there has been some controversy over the way in which risk assessment tools
get developed,9 remarkably little analysis has been conducted of the best practices
for validation in risk assessment. As a result, many validation experiments resemble
one another. Typically, the studies measure a tool’s predictive capacity by analyzing
post-conviction arrest rates over a short time-frame. They take a group of defendants
released from the same jurisdiction in a given time-frame, and determine the average
9 In Philadelphia, for example, recidivism was being measured as re-arrest rate, and because of
public opposition the sentencing commission began measuring it as subsequent conviction rate.
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re-arrest rate of defendants with di↵erent risk scores over a typical period of one
or two years. For example, Lowenkamp et al. conducted a validation experiment in
which they tested the LSI-R and the LSI-Screening Version, which screens defendants
to decide whether to administer the more in-depth LSI-R assessment (Lowenkamp,
Lovins, & Latessa, 2009). Using a look-ahead period of 1.5 years, the study measured
re-arrest rate and re-conviction rate, and found that a higher LSI-R score is positively
correlated with future incarceration.
Interestingly, algorithmic risk assessments tend to find disparate validity levels
when the same algorithm is used on racially distinct populations. Fass et al. in
2008 published validation data on the Level of Service Inventory - Revised (LSI-R)
algorithm, as well as COMPAS (Fass, Heilbrun, DeMatteo, & Fretz, 2008). Using a
dataset of 975 o↵enders released into the community between 1999-2002 from New
Jersey, the measurement period was 12 months. The purpose of the study was to
see whether these algorithms, trained on mostly white populations, are invalid for
a population like New Jersey, which has has “substantial minority” representation
in incarceration. The study finds “inconsistent validity when tested on ethnic/racial
populations” (Fass et al., 2008, 1095), meaning the predictive validity may su↵er as
the result of di↵erences between the training cohort used to develop the algorithm
and the actual demographic breakdown of a jurisdiction. Demichele et al. in “The
Public Safety Assessment: A Re-Validation” use data from Kentucky provided by
the Laurence and John Arnold Foundation, which developed the PSA. The study
measured actual failure-to-appear, new criminal activity, and new violent criminal
activity before a trial. They found that the PSA exhibited broad validity, but found
a discrepancy based on race (DeMichele et al., 2018).
Beyond recidivism, a few studies have focused on the relationship between risk
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assessment-driven decisions and other life outcomes, including earnings and family
life. Bruce Western and Sara McLanahan in 2000 published a study entitled “Fathers
Behind Bars” that finds alarming impacts of incarceration on family life. A sentence
to incarceration was found to lower the odds of parents living together by 50-70%
(Western & McClanahan, 2000). Dobbie et al. published a study that demonstrated
that pre-trial detention in Philadelphia on increased conviction rates, decreased fu-
ture income projects and decreased the probability that defendants would receive
government welfare benefits later in life (Dobbie, Goldin, & Yang, 2018). The Prison
Policy Initiative reports an unemployment rate above 27% for formerly incarcerated
people, and find a particularly pronounced e↵ects of incarceration on employment
prospects for women of color (Couloute & Kopf, 2018).
Given the deeply impactful nature of risk-based decisions, validation experiments
are surprisingly limited in scope. The outcome variable - typically rearrests in a
one or two-year window - fail to capture the many ways that a risk-assessment can
impact an individual’s family, employment, income, and attitudes - all of which may
be relevant in considering recidivism. Perhaps more importantly, the various aspects
of life impacted by detention are precisely the risk factors that may get picked up by
a subsequent judicial decision.
By treating risk assessment as instantial and analyzing longitudinal e↵ects of
a single assignment of risk, validation experiments are only observing part of the
picture. When we consider the tangible impacts of judicial decisions and relate these
impacts to future decisions, we see that there are possible feedback e↵ects in the
criminal system. The dependence of subsequent judicial decisions on prior judicial
decisions is rampant. Sentencing guidelines suggest (and often require) judges to give
longer sentences to repeat o↵enders, for example. The very notion of responsivity
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in criminal treatment requires periodic assessments that determine the ‘progress’ or
treatment e↵ect over time for a given defender, and shape punishment accordingly.
However, treatment of sequential risk-assessments and the possible harms of feedback
is missing from a literature that has so exhaustively debated whether incarceration
has a criminogenic e↵ect.
This thesis will explore how compounding in criminal justice impacts defendants.
The treatment of risk assessment as innocuous, objective, statistical prediction has
clouded rigorous theoretical exploration of lifetime compounding in criminal pun-
ishment. Using data from Philadelphia, we find that higher confinement sentences
significantly increase cumulative future incarceration sentences for defendants. Syn-
thesizing data from Philadelphia with a theoretical understanding of feedback in
algorithmic risk assessment, we will discuss implications for judges and defendants.
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Part II
Decisions
Bail and Sentencing in Philadelphia
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Chapter 3
Pretrial
The history of criminal punishment suggests that the principle of risk is more
complex and elusive than practitioners imply. With evidence from defendants in
Philadelphia, we can begin to ground risk and see empirically how people are im-
pacted. Who is risky? Where does risk concentrate? How does risk spread? And
why does risk always seem to persist, despite a massive prison complex?
Background
The U.S. jails about half a million people who have not been convicted (Wagner
& Sawyer, 2018). After an arrest, judges must decide whether defendants should
be ‘released on recognizance’ (without payment, also known as ROR), conditionally
released, or detained before their trial. Conditional releases define terms that in-
dividuals must abide by in order to be released from jail - these may range from
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drug treatment programs to supervision. Commonly, courts will choose to condition-
ally release defendants by requiring a bond (Criminal Justice Policy Program, 2016).
Bonds can be unsecured, which means that the defendant will owe a certain mone-
tary amount in the event that they fail to appear in court, or they can be secured,
which means they must pay some amount (typically 10%) in bail, up-front. When a
defendant is unable to post the cash needed for a secured bond, a bail bond agent
may act as a surety on the bond, posting the full amount of money on the condition
that the defendant pay a fee and sign over a number of rights and privileges.
Bond agents often also require that defendants sign over collateral to cover the full
bail amount - this might take the form of a house, a car, or property of a consenting
family member (Wykstra, 2018). Bond agents are given broad authority to arrest
defendants, search their belongings, and surveil them for additional criminal activity.
They can require require that clients check in regularly, keep a curfew, and hand
over medical, social security and phone records. In many instances, bondsmen can
jail defendants who fail to pay loan fees. Given that bail bond agents’ authorities
extend far beyond those of a typical consumer finance company, they have come under
scrutiny for extortion (Silver-Greenberg & Dewan, 2018).
Bail has come under attack in recent years for a variety of reasons. The com-
mercial bail bond industry is bringing in 2 billion dollars annually in profit (ACLU,
2019) and lobbying heavily to oppose calls for reform (Duncan, 2014). But the bulk
of their exploitative behavior is a↵ecting people who can a↵ord bond fees - the poor-
est defendants who can’t a↵ord fees have even bleeker prospects. Numerous stud-
ies demonstrate significant causal evidence that pre-trial detention has serious and
long-term harms on an individual. Sacks and Ackerman in 2012 find that detention
destabilizes family, increases expected incarceration length, and increases the likeli-
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hood of conviction (Sacks & Ackerman, 2012). Dobbie et al. find similar results:
With compromised bargaining power, defendants who are detained before their trial
are more likely to enter plea deals and incur guilty dispositions (Dobbie et al., 2018).
Gupta et al. find detention increases recidivism in Philadelphia (Gupta, Hansman,
& Frenchman, 2016), and another study found similar results in Texas (Stevenson &
Mayson, 2017, 672). In Philadelphia, over half of people detained pretrial would be
able to leave prison for a deposit of $1,000 or less, and many of these defendants are
‘low-risk’ - 60% of those held over three days were charged with non-violent crimes,
and 28% just had a misdemeanor charge (Stevenson, 2018, 2). Pretrial detention
also increases expected court fees and sentence lengths (Stevenson, 2018). A recently
published study by Arnold et al. in 2018 used data from Miami and Philadelphia to
find that judges exhibit significant racial bias in pre-trial release decisions, measured
using o↵ense rates of marginal white and black defendants (Arnold et al., 2018).
Calls to reform the bail system have led a few states, including New Jersey, to
completely do away with cash bail. In its place, many jurisdictions use the PSA,
which is a widely-used risk-assessment algorithm for pre-trial judicial decisions. The
potential for algorithms to predict non-compliance may allow more lenient pretrial
release measures for those that have a high probability of good behavior. It may also
remedy judicial biases. These two points are widely cited by proponents of algorithmic
risk assessment. In this section, we will explore the ways that pre-trial decisions
impact Philadelphia. We’ll closely analyze the PSA algorithm, and see how it would
direct treatment to Philadelphia residents. With a more concrete understanding
of risk and its complex relationship to di↵erent defendants in di↵erent places and
circumstances, we find that predictive risk assessment does not escape all of the
problems that plague the system of bail.
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Data
Historical bail decisions are included in court case dockets that are created for
defendants in municipal and criminal court. However, the bulk of data used in our
study came from court docket summaries that did not include information about bail.
Instead, bail decisions were scraped from the Philadelphia Court’s processing web-
site, where “New Criminal Filings” are listed for a week before being removed from
the site. These filings come from preliminary arraignments in Philadelphia Munici-
pal Court, which oversees all criminal cases before sending more serious cases to the
court of Common Pleas. Defendant name, age, zip code, charge, filing date, represen-
tation type, and custody information were listed, where applicable. In addition, bail
date, bail status (posted/set/denied), bail type (secured/unsecured), bail amount,
and outstanding bail amount are available. The defendant’s court docket summaries
are publicly accessible, so we were able to find extensive information about criminal
history.
Decisions between February 2, 2019 and April 3, 2019 were recorded. Of course,
the recency of the data available does not permit analysis of long-term outcomes
resulting from bail decisions. But the data do provide robust information about the
geographical, social and urban factors that surround bail decisions and the principle
of risk more broadly. In all, 5611 observations were recorded, and, removing null
values and repeat entries, we work with n=4889.
To analyze the tangible, geographical, and demographic information they may
be encoded in risk scoring, we retro-actively compute the Public Safety Assessment
risk scores for each individual. The algorithm relies on nine simple features about a
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defendant:
Age at Current Arrest
Current Violent O↵ense
Pending Charge at Time of O↵ense
Prior Misdemeanor Conviction
Prior Felony Conviction
Number of Prior Violent Convictions
Number of FTAs in the past 2 years
Number of FTAs older than 2 years
Prior sentence to Incarceration1
Each risk factor was calculated from docket summaries. As new states often have
to adapt their individual way of recording data to adhere to the PSA’s guidelines,
signficant manipulation was necessary to turn Pennsylvania’s docket summary sheets
into PSA risk scores.
Below are summary statistics for variables used for analysis. In this section, we
discuss simple findings from bail decisions in Philadelphia. These preliminary findings
will motivate the more involved quantitative analyses in the remaining chapters.
1 See Laurence and John Arnold Foundation, Risk Factors and Formula on the PSA Website.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Philadelphia Municipal Court Filings
mean std min 25% 50% 75% max
Demographics:
Male 0.82513 0.380 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Black 0.59354 0.491 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Age 33.3194 11.719 11. 24. 31. 40. 78.
Risk Factors:
FTA Score 1.73034 0.761 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 6.0
NCA Score 2.60429 1.331 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 6.0
NVCA Score 0.19244 0.394 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Num Prior Arrests 5.25393 7.343 0.0 1.0 3.0 8.0 155.0
Prior Misdemeanor 0.48417 0.500 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Prior Felony 0.36466 0.481 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Num Prior Crimes 2.56302 3.553 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 49.0
Num Prior Vio Crimes 0.79265 1.468 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.0
Prior Incarceration 0.44351 0.497 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Current Charge Info:
Current Vio. Charge 0.45026 0.498 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Public/no lawyer 0.94239 0.233 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bail Info:
Released Pre-Trial 0.71542 0.451 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
ROR/unsecured/cond 0.56711 0.496 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bail Amount 70033.6 1.01M 0.0 0.0 2.5K 10K 30M
Outstanding Bail Amt 593.473 11510 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 750K
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Who Encounters the Criminal System?
Municipal Court data on defendants arrested in Philadelphia represent a cohort
that is far from randomly sampled among the larger Philadelphia population. We
know this to be the case - poverty and crime are connected issues, and advancements
in quantitative social science have begun describing these social ills using using net-
worked and spatial quantitative approaches (Graif, Gladfelter, & Matthews, 2014).
Our data suggest that 59.4% of people arrested and charged with crimes in
Philadelphia are black, even though the city is just 44.1% black, as of 2015 (Otterbein,
2015). Men account for 91.7% of arrests with preliminary arraignments. 60% had
a former crime of some sort, and 44% have been sentenced to incarceration before.
94.3% of people had either “Defender Association of America” or “None” listed for
legal defense - meaning that the vast majority of people do not get help from a lawyer
when navigating the pretrial process, answering police and judicial questioning, and
making decisions about bail. This statistic implies that folks who get arrested tend
to have fewer resources to a↵ord a private attorney.
With some understanding of the population that gets arrested and charged by
police and criminal courts, we turn our attention to outcomes - in this case, bail
decisions. Of those who get arrested, 42.6% are released on recognizance, 42.5% are
o↵ered cash bail, 12% are allowed to leave with an unsecured bail bond, and 2.2%
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Figure 3.1: Population Statistics on Criminal Charges in Philadelphia
are given non-monetary conditional release. Finally, from bail status, we can see
that 28.5% of arrested people are kept in detention for some time. With a very small
fraction (0.7%) denied bail, the rest (34.9%) are unable or unwilling to pay the money.
It appears from our Philadelphia dataset that a significant number of people are
unable to pay bail, even at amounts that are quite low. While a smaller proportion
of people are detained for the lowest bail amounts than the largest, a significant
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Figure 3.2: Bail Outcomes for People Charged in Philadelphia
proportion of defendants cannot post bail at every bail amount. For cash bail amounts
under $10,000, defendants would only have to post $1,000, and a bail bonds could
be cheaper than $100. Most likely, defendants with bail this low were arrested for
misdemeanors or non-violent charges, and are considered relatively low-risk. Yet, in
just two months, we observe over a thousand people who are kept in prison because
they are unable to a↵ord bail. These people are more likely to enter plea bargains
and accept guilty sentences, even if they are not guilty (Dobbie et al., 2018). Now
imagine a risk assessment algorithm uses these individuals as data points - their higher
susceptibility to a guilty disposition will train algorithms to identify people like them,
fueling a cycle of risk-labelling that may be inaccurate, biased and costly to the state.
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Figure 3.3: Ability to post bail at di↵erent ranges
Visualizing data on Philadelphia suggests that inequity and injustice is persistent.
It is widely known that black Americans are over-represented in the U.S. prison
system, compared to their population level in America. But a closer look shows that
the cause for disparity is not a single decision - as defendants move through the pre-
trial process, they are separated by factors like race and ability to pay money. Whereas
51.4% of black people arrested are released without having to pay cash up-front, the
rate is 72.64% for everyone else. Of those o↵ered cash bail, only 34.87% could a↵ord
to post bail, and the rest had to spend time in jail for at least a night. This rate
also shows racial disparity - 33.96% of black defendants could pay bail, compared to
36.68% of other defendants. Ultimately, 31.77% of blacks are detained before their
trial, compared to just 22.31% for others. These numbers indicate the broader point
that judicial decision-making happens sequentially, and is closely connected to a host
of other human decisions. Inequality does not stem from a single racist judge, or an
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Figure 3.4: Bail decisions and outcomes by race
algorithm that has not been trained correctly - it is the result of systemic forces that
operate subtly over many decisions, events, and circumstances in society.
Mapping Risk
With the current state of bail decisions in Philadelphia, reform is appealing to
many across the political spectrum. In many ways, the glaring issues with bail have
made risk assessments seem more palatable; made evident by the risk assessment
developers who point to their ability to improve upon current judicial decisions. Are
risk-driven, algorithmic policies exempt from the inequitable treatment that many
have found in the cash bail system? Or does risk itself serve as a way to segregate
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along economic, racial and geographical lines?
With these questions in mind, we take a look at the risk level of defendants, scored
using the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) algorithm. Though Philadelphia does not
use the PSA to make pretrial decisions, we calculate the PSA on each defendant we
observe, in order to see how risk is distributed across populations and locations. The
PSA uses nine factors - all seemingly quite innocuous - to produce three scores. The
scores correspond to a defendant’s likelihood of failing to appear in court, committing
a new criminal activity, and committing a new violent criminal activity.
The maps attached show various indicators by zip code in Philadelphia. The top
row of maps contain demographic information about the observed population and
the neighborhoods. The second row provide some insight about the realities of crime,
arrests, and detention rates for people from each neighborhood. The third row of
maps measure some of the decisions that are made by judges and law enforcement -
in this case, we show arrests that led to charges, proportion of defendants released
pre-trial, and cash bail levels for each zip code. Finally, the bottom three maps
portray the three Public Safety Assessment risk scores.
We discuss a few general insights here. These insights are broad and qualita-
tive in nature. They motivate further research into entrenched biases, accumulating
disadvantage and racial disparities.
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Figure 3.5: Mapping Risk in Philadelphia
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It appears from the maps produced in Figure 4.1 that economic factors track
geographically with criminal treatment, judicial decisions and risk level. High-income
neighborhoods in the downtown area and on the outskirts of the city have low rates
of arrest and charge. They also tend to be identified as low-risk. It also seems that
higher-income neighborhoods are, on average, getting lower bail amounts, although
this may be explained by lower violence rates in these neighborhoods.
Race also seems to overlap with certain other maps. Neighborhoods with the
highest proportion of violent crime charges tend to have more black defendants. Also,
it appears that race tracks with pretrial detention, which corroborates our earlier
findings people of color are detained disproportionately compared to whites.
Finally, there appears to be a resemblance between the NCA risk map and histor-
ical arrest frequency, by zip code. Increased arrest rates in certain neighborhoods -
often those that have lower income levels and higher black populations - may influence
the factors that determine level of risk for future crime. In the coming chapters, we
will discuss the possibility of historical dependence in more detail. But the relevance
of geography is central to these broader questions in criminal policy and policing in
cities.
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Discussion
Philadelphia’s pre-trial process is far from perfect. Many defendants are being held
in jail not because of their conduct but because of their ability to pay a small amount
of money. Pre-trial detention profoundly impacts case outcomes, employment, and
personal life. As such, calls for reform argue that ability-to-pay is not an appropriate
basis on which to incarcerate some and release others.2
Black defendants from poorer neighborhoods are more likely to be held in jail
before their trial. Return on Recognizance and conditional release appear to be much
more common in more a✏uent neighborhoods, where violent crime is lower. Historical
arrests and criminal histories imply that these patterns are entrenched and systemic,
rather than the product of individual judicial decisions.
For those who concerned about the unequal treatment a↵orded because of Amer-
ica’s bail system, replacing it with an algorithm that appears to treat everyone eq-
uitably seems like a good idea. However, a closer look at the pretrial population in
Philadelphia suggests that assessing risk - whether by algorithm or by judicial discre-
tion - may carry the same problematic inequities that characterize the bail system.
The New Criminal Activity PSA score seems to be highest, on average, for defendants
that come from neighborhoods with high historical arrest rates. These neighborhoods
2 The ACLU’s page on bail reform states that American’s current system of bail is unconsti-
tutional, as it violates due process and does not a↵ord equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment. See (ACLU, 2019).
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tend to have the lower income levels, and commonly have more black residents.
These findings suggest that risk is not a designation that is inherent or funda-
mental. Instead, risk assessment tools draw information from variables embedded
in complex web of choices, labels and historical realities. While replacing bail may
significantly improve equal treatment, basing new decision-making processes on risk
may continue to entrench some of the inequity that the reform aims to remedy.
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Chapter 4
Sentencing
Background
Pennsylvania is one of just a few states with a sentencing procedure that requires
algorithmic risk assessment (Monahan & Skeem, 2016).This requirement began this
year after a decade of contentious development. Tasked with developing the risk tool,
PA’s Sentencing Commission has reported that the algorithm is not the sole determi-
nant of sentence length, and instead will be used only to determine those particularly
high- and low-risk defenders, who judges may want to review with increased discre-
tion. However, the algorithm’s mandate, design and proposed use all fit squarely
within the logic of selective incapacitation. In a report detailing the algorithm’s risk
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factor inputs and formulas, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission describes the
algorithm:
The recommendation for additional information should apply to o↵enders de-
termined to be at high risk of general recidivism or at low risk of general
recidivism . . . This targeting of cases for additional information is consistent
with the core principles of o↵ender risk management: match the level of service
to the o↵ender’s risk to recidivate; assess criminogenic needs and target them in
treatment; and structure the sentence to address the learning style, motivation,
abilities, and strengths of the o↵ender.(Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission,
2018, 5)
“Level of Service” is a commonly used term that refers to the severity of sentence that
is given to an o↵ender. The quote above is undoubtedly punitive in its portrayal of
criminal treatment - assessing risk to society comes first, and is still a central tenet to
the intervention strategy. The quote does not reference any individual’s past choices,
but is instead derived directly from a defender’s ‘risk to recidivate. Additionally,
highlighting that the tool is used most for only the highest and lowest-risk o↵enders,
the Sentencing Commission follows a pattern of many other practitioners including
Lowenkamp et al. who advocate separating convicted individuals to di↵erent facilities
based on their level of risk (Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006).
Also missing from the risk assessment algorithm’s mandate is any consideration
of the e↵ect of disparate sentencing decisions on an individual’s future of criminal
behavior and incarceration. By treating recidivism as an exogenous event, and purely
aiming to predict risk, the commission ignores the potential that sentencing higher-
risk people may cause more severe crime and fuel further incarceration. This e↵ect,
known as the criminogenic e↵ect of incarceration, has been a discussion of social
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theorists for many years.
Di↵erent theories of criminal punishment frame the goals of incarceration di↵er-
ently - some emphasize it’s deterrent e↵ect on potential o↵enders. Others believe
incarceration should be retributive, and should counterbalance social wrongs that
have been committed. Proponents of rehabilitation theory believe that correctional
facilities should address criminogenic needs of an o↵ender. An understanding of what
prison does to defendant’s in the status quo is of course necessary to characterize
incarceration and understand where it can be a useful tool in criminal punishment.
For this reason, theorists have for a long time debated whether incarceration
empirically has a criminogenic, null, or deterrent e↵ect on future crime. Camp et al.
in 2005 find no criminogenic a↵ect among 561 inmates in California with the ‘same
level of risk’ who were distributed between Level I and Level III facilities - both were
equally likely to be punished for misconduct in prison (Camp & Gaes, 2005). Bhati et
al. in 2007 attempt to estimate the impact of incarceration on subsequent o↵ending
trajectories, and find little criminogenic e↵ect - the bulk of subsequent incapacitation
came from some sort of violation of the terms of incarceration, such as parole (Bhati &
Piquero, 2007). Nagin et al. in 2009 also observe a null or mildly criminogenic e↵ect
on future criminal behavior (Nagin, Cullen, & Jonson, 2009). Vieratis et al., using
panel data over 30 years in 46 states, find a population deterrent e↵ect of increased
incarceration rates, but also find that increased prison release rates lead to higher
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rates of crime incidents, on average (Vieraitis, Kovandzic, & Marvell, 2007). Harding
et al. in 2017 analyze the e↵ects of imprisonment on felony convicts in Michigan and,
using randomized judges to establish causal inference, find that a prison sentence
increases the probability of subsequent imprisonment by 18-19% (Harding, Moreno↵,
Nguyen, & Bushway, 2017).
The jury is out, so to speak, on the deterrent and criminalizing e↵ects of prison.
Thus, understanding whether a criminogenic e↵ect exists in Philadelphia should be
very relevant to an overhaul of sentencing guidelines. Instead, Pennsylvania joins
other states in treating crime as external and inevitable; perhaps predictable but
otherwise uncontrollable.
We analyze the question of criminogenic e↵ects in sentencing by looking at Court
of Common Pleas sentences in 2011. We wish to understand whether di↵erences in
sentencing that is not attributable to criminal risk or behavior has a long-term impact
on cumulative prison time incurred via subsequent sentencing.
Data
Philadelphia has made court summary documents filed since 2007 publicly avail-
able. These documents are created or updated each time a defendant has a prelim-
inary arraignment subsequent to arrest. Preliminary arraignments, which typically
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occur a few hours after an arrest, allow a defendant to be notified of charges be-
ing brought, the date of a preliminary hearing, and information about bail. The
Philadelphia Municipal Court has jurisdiction over all preliminary arraignment hear-
ings, misdemeanor court trials, and preliminary hearings for felony trials. Felony
trials and other more serious trials are heard in the Court of Common Pleas.1
To analyze whether subsequent incarceration has a feedback-e↵ect on future in-
carceration rates, we limit our sample to defendants who have been convicted in the
Court of Common Pleas. Scraping the first 12,066 case summaries filed in 2011, we
obtain demographic information, historical arrest and court outcomes, crime severity,
sentencing, and future court information to the present. Up-to-date docket summaries
contain information about encounters with any court system in Philadelphia, as well
as migrated cases from other jurisdictions.
Bail information is not readily accessible from docket summaries. However, when
a defendant fails to appear at their trial, a bench warrant is issued and the status
change is recorded in docket summaries. Using the thorough historical information
in docket summaries, we retroactively compute PSA scores for defendants, as we did
in our analysis of bail decisions.
1 The following URL provides portal access to any docket summary by docket number:
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Cases
mean std min 25% 50% 75% max
Treatment Variable:
confinement max (days) 261.13 298.98 0.0 0.0 182 365 1095
Risk Factors:
fta score 1.8711 0.7320 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 5.0
nca score 2.9260 1.3587 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 6.0
nvca score 0.2671 0.4425 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
prior m 0.4243 0.4943 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
prior f 0.3496 0.4769 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
plea flag 0.8348 0.3714 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
number prior crimes 2.4299 3.0812 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 29.0
num prior violent crimes 0.8573 1.5220 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 14.0
prior incarceration flag 0.5084 0.5000 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
num prior arrests 5.5725 6.6846 0.0 1.0 3.0 8.0 60.0
Demographics:
age (days) 12869. 4026.9 4411 9739 1.2K 15524 28360
male flag 0.8887 0.3146 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
black flag 0.6887 0.4631 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Disposition Severity:
felony flag 0.7826 0.4125 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
misdemeanor flag 0.3503 0.4771 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
degree 1.1762 1.1813 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
(felony flag)(degree) 0.9186 1.2086 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0
(misdemeanor flag)(degree) 0.4684 0.8630 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0
count guilty charges 1.7067 1.0492 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 12.0
current violent charge 0.5982 0.4903 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
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Testing Criminogenic E↵ects of Incarceration
Using data from Philadelphia, we can explore the impact of incarceration on
defendants’ futures. Specifically, we aim to explore the question of dependence in
sequential decisions in criminal justice. Given a defendant with a certain propensity
to violate the law, how might detention for a certain amount of time a↵ect their
expected future time in prison?
To test the impact of incarceration on life-courses in Philadelphia, we propose
leveraging the fact that Philadelphia has not historically used algorithms to dictate
sentencing decisions. Using risk factors as controls to compare between defendant
outcomes, we analyze see how disparate sentence lengths may impact future incarcer-
ation. In other words, we set out to answer the following question empirically: Given
two defendants with identical risk factors, how are di↵erences in prison sentencing
associated with cumulative future incarceration rates, measured up to 2 years after
release?
Our question departs from existing criminogenic research because of its focus
on confinement lengths, rather than criminal behavior or probability of arrest. We
take no stance on the moral quality of the behavior of defendants, or the accuracy
of trials or arrests as proxies for delinquency. Instead, we simply wish to see how
incapacitation as a social phenomenon may breed self-reinforcement and feedback.
Reverse-engineering the PSA’s three predictive scores - new criminal activity, new
violent criminal activity, and failure to appear - as well as many underlying risk
factors that are shared by algorithms across the country, we control for present risk
of defendant at the time of sentencing. To control for the severity of a given crime,
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we include covariates to representing the typology of o↵ense committed - felony and
misdemeanor dummies, the ‘degree’ of the felony/misdemeanor, cross-terms, and the
total number of guilty charges incurred.
We use a linear regression model with covariates X reported above. We aim to
find the average incremental treatment e↵ect of an extra day of sentenced prison time
on the expected cumulative duration of prison sentences accrued until 2 years after
the minimum sentenced time in prison. The treatment variable x1 is measured using
maximum sentences. We’re fitting the following equation:
Yˆ =  TX
Y := [2 year cumulative incarceration mins]
 T := [ 1,  2,  3, ...]
In the above equation, X refers to our observation matrix; each column represents
our observation of a single defendant, and each row is a covariate listed in Table 4.1.
The potential for unobserved variable bias is important to note here, because
judges may be seeing factors that are not reported in court docket summaries but
may be relevant for sentencing. In particular, it is likely that judges cater sentences
to di↵erent crimes that have the same grade, and may also cater sentences to par-
ticular combinations of multiple crimes that hold relevance for future incarceration
prospects. To make sure our results are not representing our own shortcomings in
modelling crime severity, we perform a second regression where we limit the sample
to only defendants who commit the same crime, and who only are found guilty of that
particular crime. We choose the most common crime in Philadelphia, “Manufacture,
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Delivery, or Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver” - a non-violent felony
with degree = 0. For our second regression, we take out factors that have to do with
current criminal severity, since everybody is convicted with the same crime.
Results
A regression was performed for all cases in the Court of Common Pleas, and an
additional regression was performed on only those cases which have an identical, sin-
gle guilty disposition for drug dealing. With models described above, we test for
the average incremental treatment e↵ect of a day in prison on the expected cumula-
tive length of prison sentences, measured until two years after the minimum prison
sentence. Results are reported below.
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Table 1: Criminogenic E↵ect of Confinement in Philadelphia
Dependent Variable:
2-year minimum cumulative sentence
All charges Only Manuf./Possess./Deliv.
Treatment Variable:
confinement max 0.1286*** 0.0938**
(0.0249) (0.0451)
Risk Factors:
fta score -17.4921 -103.3698***
(21.7752) (38.4002)
nca score 17.8048 66.3430***
(13.5443) (24.6393)
nvca score -12.3632 47.1921
(23.4130) (39.2216)
number prior crimes 0.7477 0.1927
(5.8815) (11.2610)
number prior violent -7.3534 -19.4765
(6.8279) (13.1349)
prior incarceration flag 3.5053 -21.0556
(23.1688) (40.9863)
num prior arrests 4.9809** 4.6289
(2.4096) (5.1231)
prior m 9.4684 33.6151
(18.8997) (31.9502)
prior f 54.2776*** 4.5463
(18.3891) (32.4370)
Demographics:
age -0.0128*** -0.0163***
(0.0021) (0.0041)
male flag 45.5795** 65.2217
(21.9017) (52.8662)
black flag -7.8428 -12.8142
(14.6471) (25.5853)
plea flag -70.8348*** -155.8573***
(19.8014) (56.1067)
Current Crime Severity:
felony flag -64.1872
(40.2028)
misdemeanor flag -17.5152
(35.4556)
degree -33.2990
(24.0823)
(felony flag)(degree) 40.5926*
(23.1846)
(misdemeanor flag)(degree) 19.8258
(18.0401)
count guilty charges -19.5394**
(7.6839)
current violent charge 29.0483
(17.7124)
N 6215 1473
R2 0.008 0.033
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.023
F -statistic 7.323*** 3.521***
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01
10
Regression results indicate that an additional day of sentencing is associated with
0.129 more days in prison sentences accrued two years after release, on average. For
non-violent drug felony o↵enders, the estimated e↵ect of incarceration is 0.094 extra
days of prison time, on average. The regression that included all types of crime
was statistically significant with p < 0.01, whereas the drug-only regression was
statistically significant at p < 0.05.
While the results do provide evidence of a criminogenic impact of incarceration, it’s
important to note the possible alternative explanations for the observed treatment
e↵ect. First, unobserved variables might be influencing judge decisions. If judges
use factors that were not controlled for and statistically correlate with future crime
rates, we might observe the correlation in sentencing, which would suggest a causal
relationship that is not only explained by di↵erences in sentencing rates. We included
the second regression because we were concerned that this bias might exhibit itself in
the broad sentencing regression. The fact that there appears to be strong evidence
of a criminogenic e↵ect in both regressions is promising, but there may be other
unobserved variables. One that may currently influence judicial decisions, since it is
being adopted as part of Philadelphia’s new sentencing tools, is juvenile delinquency
history. Unless juveniles were tried in adult court, their record in inaccessible. While
such a practice on face value seems to confirm our claim that sequential decisions in
criminal justice compound (and are highly sensitive to inital conditions), being able
to include juvenile information as another risk control would improve our confidence
in concluding a criminogenic e↵ect of incapacitation.
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Some Evidence of Divergence
The regression results reported above use a two-year measurement window for
outcomes. To explore the more dynamic e↵ects of incarceration, we calculate the
population-wide cumulative sentences for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 year windows.
For both regressions conducted - all crimes and only single drug dealing convic-
tions - we found that the estimated e↵ect of incarceration on subsequent incarcer-
ation lowered year-by-year, and also decreased in statistical significance. This is to
be expected, because people are more likely to reo↵end in the transitionary period
subsequent to release. Below, we plot sentence totals over time for white and black
defendants. The plots show a persistent gap in conviction rates, where formerly-
incarcerated black people are more likely to collect additional prison sentences than
formerly-incarcerated whites. However, we can’t be resoundingly confident of this dif-
ference from the data alone. An estimator for the di↵erence year-by-year, as well as
the standard error, is included below. Importantly, the error bars in the second plot
represent a single standard error in either direction of our estimator, so the di↵erence
does not pass statistical confidence at the current number of observations.
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Figure 4.1: Potential Racial Divergence in Outcomes
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Discussion
Empirical results suggest that when a defendant is sentenced to an extra day in
prison in Philadelphia, they can expect to spend more than one extra day in prison
over the course of their lifetime. There are numerous explanations for why this may
be the case, and there are numerous implications for policy-makers.
A criminogenic e↵ect may result from peer networks that develop in prison. Some
have found that exposure to people who are ’high risk’ can increase crime (Lowenkamp
et al., 2006). Other explanations include harmful e↵ects of being labeled as a criminal
for employment and family (Western & McClanahan, 2000). Higher sentences may
also come with higher surveillance after release through programs like probation,
which would lead to higher hit rates for former o↵enders, even if they do not commit
crimes at higher rates. Regardless, significant statistical evidence suggests that this
e↵ect does exist broadly in Philadelphia.
The e↵ect of prison time on future encounters with criminal punishment implies
that algorithmic risk-assessment tools cannot be assessed using instantial experiments
at one time in a defendant’s life. Of course, it’s important to mention that the study
above is an instantial experiment at one point in a defendant’s life. It also uses a
risk-assessment tool to control for a defendant’s propensity to be re-convicted. How-
ever, it is using these methods to explore how decisions impact defendants, not to
understand a defendant’s fundamental propensity to violate the law. If a single crim-
inal sentence can impact a defendant’s life outcome, subsequent sentences may add
to this e↵ect, and prison time can compound. Thus, we do not argue that the treat-
ment e↵ect encompasses the entire e↵ect of criminal sentencing. Instead, it suggests
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that sentencing decisions may follow a compounding process, and disadvantage may
accumulate for defendants over numerous encounters with the criminal system.
Our dataset suggests that defendants tried in Philadelphia’s Court of Common
Pleas can expect to be arrested more than two more times in the future, regardless
of the number of times they’ve been arrested in the past. If larger sentences are
associated with greater prison time, it is likely that longer sentences hold bearing
on future risk assessment. A more severe sentence may lead parole o cers to have
more discretion over parolees. It may increase a defendant’s association with other
criminals. This kind of dependence between decisions is clear from sentencing tables
and three-strikes rules, which recommend that judges give exaggerated sentences to
repeat-o↵enders.
Since judicial decisions appear to feed into one another sequentially over a de-
fendant’s life time, it is important to consider models that encompass compounding
e↵ects. Risk assessment algorithms and validation experiments fail to adequately ad-
dress the potential of feedback e↵ects over time. Rigorously considering the impacts
if dependent, sequential decisions will be necessary for any high-stakes algorithm that
makes decisions temporally. In the forthcoming section, we explore the possibility of
compounding disadvantage and model problematic e↵ects that may arise, undetected
by instantial validation techniques.
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Part III
Impacts
The Dangers of Compounding Injustice
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Chapter 5
Theoretical Modeling
Disadvantage can accumulate over time. The notion of compounding e↵ects in
decision-making is intuitive – discrimination is instantiated when somebody con-
sciously discriminates, but the e↵ects of discrimination are often felt when the bias
is more insidious and systemic. For example, even if gender-based discrimination is
nearly undetectable at a single stage in a company’s hiring or promotion process,
executive teams tend to show remarkably little diversity (Probert, 2005). Similar
e↵ects have been observed in education and wage rates, where a lifetime (or even
inter-generational) time frame is needed to understand how bias becomes entrenched
and can perpetuate over time.
Thus, statistical methods that try to find instances of discrimination may not
capture biases that compound over repeated decisions. Another challenge for research
is the di culty of developing rigorous models of systemic e↵ects. These processes
can be highly complex because they involve information about history – something
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that traditional regression techniques lack. In a text entitled “Measuring Racial
Discrimination” by the National Research Council in 2004, a chapter devoted to
compounding e↵ects concedes that the field is under-analyzed. The text observes,
“Measures of discrimination that focus on episodic discrimination at a particular
place and point in time may provide very limited information on the e↵ect of dynamic,
cumulative discrimination” (Paer, 2005, 226). As a result, more research is needed,
despite modeling di culties. The authors write:
Very little research has attempted to model or estimate cumulative e↵ects. In
part, this is because modeling and estimating dynamic processes that occur
over time can be extremely di cult. The di culty is particularly great if one
is trying to estimate causal e↵ects over time. (Paer, 2005, 224)
Indeed, theorists have found that survey and panel experimentation usually have
not been able to capture the accumulating disadvantage that can cyclically a↵ect a
group of people, or cause divergent levels of wealth or status in society (Lyons &
Pettit, 2011). Instantiated experiments are unable to capture the dynamic nature
of cumulative e↵ects, and therefore often underestimate coe cients that determine
measure of inequity.
What are dynamic e↵ects, and how might they be occurring in criminal justice?
If risk, as currently defined, compounds over time, is it a proper goal to cater pun-
ishment severity to risk? We will explore the theoretical underpinnings of risk. A
rigorous treatment of dependence in sequential decision-making indicates that, in-
deed, compounding e↵ects are possible and have the potential to lead to unexpected
and unfair practices for certain defendants.
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Context
Predictive decisions commonly use variables that change over time. Risk assess-
ment literature makes a designation between ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ features(Picard-
Fritsche et al., 2017), though even so-called static features include information about
criminal history, which of course can changes over time. As algorithms are adopted at
more stages throughout a defendant’s life (arrest, bail, trial, sentencing, confinement,
probation, parole, re-arrest), changes in defendant characteristics become entangled
with criminal decision outcomes. Pretrial detention has been shown to increase the
probability of conviction by lowering bargaining power, decrease employment oppor-
tunity, and decrease future government assistance (Dobbie et al., 2018). It also in-
creases rates of re-arrest after disposition (Gupta et al., 2016), (Leslie & Pope, 2017).
Downstream e↵ects ranging from family stress to court fees have profound impacts on
people’s lives, and indeed, on features that are deemed ‘risk factors’ for defendants.
A report from the Center for Court Innovation categorizes the most common factors
used by algorithms today:
Criminal History Substance Abuse
School or Work Deficits Antisocial Personality Pattern
Demographics Leisure Activities
Family Dysfunction Criminal Peer Networks
Antisocial Attitudes Residential Instability1
1 See (Picard-Fritsche et al., 2017, 5-6).
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Perhaps with the exception of demographics, each one of these factors is pro-
foundly impacted by months of detention. Thus, in the event that numerous assess-
ments are used consecutively on the same person, there may be unintended e↵ects.
Modelling Sequential Risk Assessments
We begin with a simple model of risk-needs driven decisions. Given that exist-
ing risk assessment services emphasize their wide applicability, some algorithms are
adopted at numerous stages in criminal proceedings.2 Other jurisdictions may use
di↵erent assessments for policing, bail, sentencing and parole. Starting simple, we
model risk assessments as instantaneous binary decisions that are separated in time.
Each decision occurs sequentially, and the outcome is either “high risk” or “low risk”,
as visualized below.
We assume here that risk assessments are conducted n times throughout a person’s
2 An LSI brochure claims their algorithm is “proven to accurately predict recidivism, vi-
olence, and a large number of other relevant outcomes.” It continues, “One of the
most widely used instruments for the assessment of recidivism, the LS instruments are
currently being used by probation, parole, community corrections, prisons, psycholo-
gists and mental health professionals.” URL: https://issuu.com/mhs-assessments/docs/ls-
cmi.lsi-r.brochure insequence?e=20431871/45044118. See also COMPAS Case Supervi-
sion Review tool for repeatedly re-assessing risk during detention/proceedings. URL:
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/downloads/FAQ Document.pdf.
65
life, and each decision i 2 {1, 2, ..., N} is a random variable denoted Xi, with:
Xi 2
n 1, if defendant is classified high-risk
0, if defendant is classified low-risk
We model each assessment using the current state of the world before decision i, de-
noted Si 1, and the probability that a defendant will be designated high-risk, denoted
pi:
P (Xi = 1|Si 1) = pi
The assessment is a random variable and not deterministic because risk assessment
algorithms do not solely determine defendant outcomes - the ultimate decision is still
up to a judge, who references the risk assessment score as part of the broader pre-trial
policy decision.
We wish to explore the possibility that outcomes of assessments may impact and
alter future assessments. As such, our model must enable us to analyze cases where
the outcome variable Xi may impact the probability of high-risk classification for
Xi+1, Xi+2, ..., XN . The probability of a high-risk classification at decision i can thus
be thought of as a function of some defendant information Di (gender, race, age) and
the history prior decisions, Hi. We write the current state of beliefs at i as Si =
{Di, Hi}. We more accurately portray this dependence on the history of decisions as
a branching process, rather than a sequence of decisions:
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Every major risk assessment algorithm uses information about criminal history to
assess risk. PSA, for example, measures a defendant’s number of prior misdemeanors,
felonies, convictions, and violent convictions.3 These numbers add various point
values to a risk assessment score, and a threshold value may determine pre-trial
detention or cash bail amounts. Therefore, the PSA and most (if not all) other
algorithms have a reinforcement e↵ect. After an individual is convicted with a felony
charge, every subsequent risk assessment for the rest of his life will use his criminal
history to increase his risk score. Thus, initial assessments of risk can hold more
‘weight’ in determining lifetime treatment than later assessments. If a person is
identified as high-risk in their first encounter with the criminal system, known e↵ects
on future crime rates, employment, family life, taxes, and other features will increase
the likelihood of subsequent encounters.
3 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula. URL:
https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors.
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This property of reinforcement is key to modeling our system. The process is
not Markovian: history matters, and our state of beliefs changes over time. Instead,
we understand the changing e↵ects of sequential risk-assessments as an Urn process,
derived from the classic Po´lya Urn model in mathematics (Pemantle et al., 2007).
Dependence and Reinforcement
Let’s say each risk assessment decision a↵ects subsequent decisions as follows: If
Xi 1 is the risk-assessment outcome for decision i  1, the subsequent probability of
a high-risk decision pi is a weighted average between pi 1, the prior probability, and
Xi 1, the most recent classification:
pi = pi 1 [ i] +Xi 1 [1   i] , i 2 {2, ..., N},  i 2 [0, 1]
This means that we model updates in risk score by averaging the prior assumed risk
and the outcome of a new assessment. The Xi 1 term can be thought of as the
marginal e↵ect of a new classification on defendant risk. To model reinforcement, we
allow  i to increase as i increases, letting prior risk score pi 1 hold more importance
as a defendant is older and has more history. This should make intuitive sense - if a
defendant has lived out most of his life with a certain propensity for criminal activity
(‘risk’), the e↵ect of a new assessment should carry less weight.
Using the above intuition, we’ll start by assuming the following relationship be-
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tween  i and i (the number of encounters with the criminal justice system):
 i =
i
i+ 1
To understand the equation above, let’s consider the value of  i for varying i. In a
first encounter with criminal courts where i = 1, we’d have  1 =
1
2 . Risk assessment
outcome X1 would thus have a very strong impact on future risk assessments. When
i is high, however,  i approaches 1 and new assessments would diminish in weight.
This is the reinforcement property we’re seeking - the more decisions that go by, the
less weighty they are in determining a person’s lifetime experience with the state’s
criminal system.
Thus, our formula for P (Xi|D,Hi) is:
P (Xi|pi 1, Xi 1) = pi 1

i
i+ 1
 
+Xi 1

1
i+ 1
 
, i 2 {2, ..., N} (5.1)
Let’s assume temporarily that every defendant starts o↵ with a probability of high-
risk classification p1 =
1
2 . We model the e↵ect of sequential risk-assessments for
di↵erent defendants by implementing our iterative equation. Below are sample paths
for 5 defendants who are subject to ten periodic, evenly spaced assessments over time:
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In the plot above, each color represents an individual who encounters criminal risk
assessments throughout their life. Notice that this plot behaves in accordance with the
reinforcement e↵ect - initial assessments have large e↵ects on pi, and later assessments
only marginally change the course of the risk level. Indeed, the for very large i the risk
level approaches a straight-line, meaning that the system reaches a stable propensity
for criminal activity. Below are the paths of the same five defendants, this time over
a total of 100 assessments (so 90 additional assessments):
While it is unrealistic that a single person would have one hundred exactly evenly
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spaced and identical assessments throughout their lives, the behavior of our model
seems to cohere with our knowledge of risk-assessments - their output impacts future
assessments in a way that reinforces their classification. In other words, people de-
tained after being identified as high-risk are more likely to re-o↵end, spend time in
jail, have financial trouble, lose employment, or receive a guilty charge - all of which
will a↵ect their level of ‘risk’.
Po`lya’s Urn Generalization
The model derived above is an Urn process. Borrowing a few theorems from
probability theory, we can begin to understand the large-scale, long-term e↵ects that
might come about when algorithms are used consecutively throughout a person’s life.
Po´lya’s Urn Model
Po`lya’s Urn is a classic model in probability theory, introduced by George Po`lya in
an attempt to model infectious disease.(Pemantle et al., 2007, 5) The model describes
path-dependent branching processes that are ’exchangeable’, meaning the order of
prior events does not matter.4 The model asks what the long-term distribution of
blue balls will be in the following random process:
4 This is an assumption that may not hold true for our case, because many algorithms care about
how recent a historical event took place. PSA, for example, cares about prior failures to appear
in court in the past two years. However, for the most part, algorithms consider the aggregate
number of historical events - number of prior felonies, misdemeanors, convictions, etc. These
indicators are all exchangeable in the sense that it doesn’t matter when in the defendant’s life
they occurred.
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• An urn contains Ri red balls and Bi blue balls. Start at i = 0, with an initial
mix of R0 and B0 balls.
• for iteration i 2 {1, ..., N}:
– Pick a ball randomly from the urn.
– For the ball picked, return it and k additional balls of the same color to
the urn.
Urn Equivalence to Risk Assessment Model
We can model reinforcement in algorithmic decision-making as an urn process.
Our basic defendant model replicates exactly the basic Po`lya process with R0 = 1,
B0 = 1, and k = 1. We derive the equivalence in the two processes below.
Denote the color of the ball selected by pick i 2 {1, 2, ..., N} as:
X˜i 2
n 1, if blue ball is picked
0, if red ball is picked
Assuming each ball is picked with equal probability, the probability of picking blue
in is given by:
P (X˜i = 1) =
Bi 1
Bi 1 +Ri 1
The total number of ball in the urn is ni = Ri+Bi. The probability of picking blue
given all prior picks is denoted as p˜i. We can always find p˜i by dividing the number
of blue balls in the urn by the total number of balls. We’ve shown that pi =
Bi 1
ni 1 .
After the ith pick, what will be the probability of picking blue? We inevitably add k
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balls into the urn, so ni = ni 1 + k. In the event that our pick is red, we still have
Bi 1 blue balls, so the probability of picking blue decreases to
Bi 1
ni 1+k . If we do pick
blue, however, the probability increases to Bi 1+kni 1+k . Thus, the probability of picking
blue on the (i+ 1)th pick, given B0, n0 and X˜1, is:
p˜i+1 =
Bi 1 + X˜ik
ni 1 + k
With a bit of algebra, we can define this probability in terms of the probability
for the prior pick:
p˜i+1 =
Bi 1
ni 1 + k
+ X˜i
k
ni 1 + k
=

Bi 1
ni 1
 
ni 1
ni 1 + k
+ X˜i
k
ni 1 + k
) p˜i+1 = p˜i
ni 1
ni 1 + k
+ X˜i
k
ni 1 + k
When k = 1 and R0 = B0 = 1, how does ni behave? It starts at n0 = 2, and after
each pick it increments by k = 1. Thus, ni = 2 + i. Equivalently, ni 1 = 1 + i, and
ni 2 = i. Using the relationship derived above, a shift in index yields the probability
of picking blue p˜i for i 2 {2, ..., N}:
p˜i = p˜i 1
ni 2
ni 2 + k
+ X˜i 1
k
ni 2 + k
= p˜i 1

i
i+ 1
 
+ X˜i 1

1
i+ 1
 
(5.2)
Notice the equivalence to equation 5.1. We’ve shown the probability for picking
blue at each iteration of the classic Po´lya Urn process exactly equals the probability
of a high-risk classification in our simple model of sequential risk assessments, where
p˜i = pi and X˜i = Xi.
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Long-Run Behavior
When we say that a sequence of random decisions might exhibit reinforcement,
we now know that this means something deeper mathematically. Random processes
with reinforcement behave in certain ways that might be problematic in the context
of criminal policy. We have a general sense that algorithmic decisions in criminal
justice impact defendants profoundly, and likely impact future encounters with law
enforcement. Leveraging insights from probability theory, we can begin to understand
the danger of policies that have compounding e↵ects.
To start, we analyze the long-term treatment of individuals that are subject to
sequential risk-based decisions. In Robin Pemantle’s “A Survey of Random Processes
with Reinforcement” (2006), the following theorem is reported about Po`lya’s Urn
process:
Theorem 2.1: The random variable pi =
Bi
Bi+Ri
converges almost surely for
large i to a limit P . The distribution of P is: P ⇠  (a, b) where a = B0k and
b = R0k . In the case where a = b = 1, the limit variable P is uniform on [0, 1].
(Pemantle et al., 2007)
Theorem 2.1 lays out how we can expect our modeled risk assessments to be-
have over many iterations. If one person undergoes risk assessments numerous times
throughout their life, they may end up in radically di↵erent places depending on the
risk-assessment outcome. They may be able to steer clear of subsequent confinement
and re-arrest, or they may be continuously surveiled and repeatedly penalized by the
state.
For a preliminary understanding of how inter-dependence in repeated risk assess-
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ments can impact a population, we use our initial modeling assumption that p1 = 0.5
(so B0 = R0 and a = b), and imagine varying the parameter that determines the
bearing of prior assessments on updated assessments, k (which defines  ). If we de-
crease k to 0.1 so that a = b = B0k = 10, we have the following long-term distribution
for defendant risk:
Figure 5.1: PDF of long term risk level when k = 0.1
When decisions have little impact on people’s lives (and potential subsequent risk
assessments), we see consistency in long-term outcomes. Everyone starts with a risk
score of 0.5, and all end up somewhere near there even after many assessments.
However, if algorithmic-driven decisions are more sensitive to the e↵ect of prior
decisions with a = b = B0k = 0.1, then we can see very problematic behavior in the
long term:
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Figure 5.2: PDF of long term risk level when k = 10
In this second case, we begin with defendants that are identical in attributes, with
an initial probability of high-risk classification p1 = 0.5. However, simply because of
the e↵ect of risk-based decision making, defendants end up with radically di↵erent
risk levels, and are highly likely to be pushed to an extreme (no criminal risk, 0, and
extreme criminal risk, 1).
Of course, these results are purely theoretical and do not come from real observed
processes. But they motivate the importance of scrutinizing how algorithms are used
in practice. Algorithms may be validated to ensure that biases are mitigated to a
certain confidence threshold. But even tiny disparities in the system described by the
second plot above can profoundly impact outcomes.
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Modeling Inequality
Many critics of risk assessment tools have expressed concern that these tools may
encode biases that have historically characterized United States law enforcement.
So far, our analysis of compounding e↵ects has shown that these tools can lead to
radically disparate treatment between people who began with the same risk factors.
However, the analysis has not yet touched on existing and historical inequity. If a
biased risk assessment tool were used, and it exhibited compounding e↵ects, how
might we expect bias to propagate over time? We can use our urn model to answer
this question theoretically.5
Disparate Initial Conditions
Risk assessment tools claim to add a level of consistency and ’objectivity’ that
judges lack without algorithmic assistance. Since judges have historically been biased
in certain ways, many algorithmic tools boast that their improved accuracy can allow
more people (of all groups) to leave detention pre-trial without increasing crime rates.
Even if we assume that our algorithm perfectly predicts risk and is able to eschew
any kind of racially encoded bias, we know factually that risk is unevenly distributed
across race.6 A randomly selected black individual who finds himself arrested for a
crime, therefore, is more likely to be labeled as high risk than an average white person
in the same circumstances7.
5 (Kleinberg et al., 2017) discussees lowering the number of black people incarcerated as a po-
tential goal for algorithmic criminal decisions.
6 See (Harcourt, 2014).
7 (Harcourt, 2008, The Virtues of Randomization) demonstrates that, as long as there is profiling,
the arrested population will not accurately represent the true o↵ending population demograph-
ically (absent perfect crime detection).
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What are the long-term impacts of adopting algorithmic risk-assessments when
risk is unevenly distributed across racial groups? How can our simple model of sequen-
tial risk assessments help us understand compounding e↵ects and biased treatment?
Our first line of inquiry will look at the initial risk score that a defendant receives
in a first encounter with the criminal justice system. Recalling our sequential decision-
making model, we were able to describe the entire system with two quantities: the
initial ’risk level’ p1 and the system’s sensitivity to new decisions,
n0
k . What happens
when we change the initial risk level, p0, among defendants, and allow the rest of the
process to remain the same?
Let’s start by looking at what the expected value of our risk level, pi, will be for
time-step i, assuming only the prior risk pi 1. We have from equation 5.2 that:
p˜i+1 = p˜i
ni 1
ni 1 + k
+ X˜i
k
ni 1 + k
Taking the expectation over the linear equation:
E(pi+1) =
ni 1
ni 1 + k
E(pi) +
k
ni 1 + k
E(Xi)
Using our knowledge that an indicator variable has expectation equal to its probability
of being 1, we know:
E(pi+1) =
ni 1
ni 1 + k
pi +
k
ni 1 + k
pi =
ni 1 + k
ni 1 + k
pi = pi
Therefore, for any pi 2 [0, 1], the urn process maintains the same expected risk
level, no matter how convergent or divergent the risk becomes over sequential deci-
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sions. This means that if black individuals are, on average, more likely to be labeled
as high-risk individuals, our model of algorithmic risk assessments will not rectify
these inequalities over time.
Some, including Kleinberg, believe that algorithmic risk assessment can lower
the number of black people incarcerated (Kleinberg et al., 2017). Note that this is
di↵erent from rectifying inequalities that exist in assessments: as long as the rate of
white defendants decreases by the same rate proportion, the system is still treating
more black people as high-risk than whites.
However, it is important to note that varying the initial probability of conviction
does not lead to divergent e↵ects for white and black people. The static expected
risk for both groups implies that an initial bias will not perpetuate or magnify biases
over time, according to our model. Purportedly unbiased algorithms can perpetuate
and codify existing biases, therefore, but are unlikely to lead to divergent treatment
as the result of initial conditions, according to our model.
Entrenched Algorithmic Bias
Say, instead of assuming di↵erent initial probabilities of high-risk classifications
for white and black folks, we instead assume that the algorithm itself produces biased
judgments each time it makes a decision. Since no algorithm in use takes in race
as an explicit variable, we may assume that race is reconstructed using correlated
variables. Before, our urn model looked at risk assessments as a weighted average of
prior risk belief and a random variable representing the most recent risk-assessment
result. Now, let’s add a race indicator to our weighting system. Now, each decision
is a function of prior risk, the outcome of the most recent assessment, and the race
of the defendant. If we denote the race of the defendant as a variable R, and write
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simply:
R 2
n 1, if defendant is black
0, if defendant is white
Then we can write the biased risk level at decision i as pbi , defined below:
pbi = p
b
i 1 [ i] +R [⇢] +X
b
i 1 [1   i   ⇢] , i 2 {2, ..., N},  i 2 [0, 1], ⇢ 2 [0, 1   i]
We don’t assume ⇢ to depend on i, as we might assume ⇢ to be a function of
static features that do not change over time - education level, age at first arrest,
family criminal history, etc.
When this is the case, we see that the bias a↵ects every step in the algorithm
and our system converges almost surely to 1 for black people and 0 for whites, so
long as ⇢ > 0. Below are simulated risk assessments for adding a weight of 0.01 to
each assessment - a level of bias that could go undetected in statistical validation
experiments.
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Conclusion
After Federal oversight and military presence began to withdraw from the South
at the end of Reconstruction, Southern governments promptly moved to limit black
voting. Even as lynching and direct intimidation became less common, one practice -
poll literacy tests - persisted in the South until the civil rights legislation of the 1960s
(Goldman, 2004). Citing voter intelligence - rather than race explicitly - Southern
states defended these discretionary tests against accusations of racism. The Supreme
Court even upheld the tests in Lassiter vs. Northampton Election Board (1959),
finding that literacy could be an appropriate basis upon which to restrict voting. In
the Court’s opinion, Justice William Douglas wrote:
Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record are obvious examples
indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the
qualifications of voters. The ability to read and write likewise has some relation
to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. (Lassiter vs.
Northampton Election Board (1959), Court Opinion, 51 )
These tests have become emblematic of the historical coordinated e↵orts to disenfran-
chise black Americans. And they worked - in 1960, 30% of black southerners voted.
In Mississippi, just 6.7% of black people voted, down from 70% in 1867 (Shapiro,
1993, 537-8), (Goldman, 2004, 617).
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The actuarial age in criminal justice holds analogues to poll tests for three reasons.
First, both purport to be race-blind, but rely on measures that resoundingly exhibit
racial inequity. Even if poll tests measured literacy levels objectively and without
bias, their use could reliably exclude black Americans disproportionately, because
segregated education in the United States left a gap in literacy. This reality became
more o cially recognized after a shift in opinion from the Supreme Court. In Gaston
County v. United States (1965), the Court ruled that “the County deprived its black
residents of equal educational opportunities, which in turn deprived them of an equal
chance to pass the literacy test” (Gaston County v. United States, Court Opinion,
291 ). Goldman in 2004 makes the analogy between poll tests’ reliance on disparities
in education and felony disenfranchisement relying on inequality in conviction. But
institutional, discretionary reliance is not unique to felon disenfranchisement. In-
stead, it plagues virtually every decision in criminal punishment - arrest, bail, trial,
sentencing, probation and parole. And risk assessments don’t just rely on criminal
history; they, too, often rely on education level, psychiatric labels, employment status,
and housing.
Second, poll literacy tests and risk assessments are similar because they use self-
referential logic to formalize and entrench existing power dynamics. When Southern
lawmakers came under political pressure from illiterate whites whose voting rights
were in jeopardy, many Southern states adopted ‘Grandfather Clauses.’ These clauses
permitted the descendants of anybody who could vote before the Civil War to skip
literacy tests. These exemptions blatantly targeted the descendants of slaves for the
literacy requirement, which became nearly impossible to pass. As risk assessments
moved away from using race explicitly in the 1960s, they underwent a similar tra-
jectory: they began asking about the criminal history of family members, neighbors
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and peers. A released COMPAS questionnaire has a whole section devoted to ‘Fam-
ily Criminality’ - in it, defendants must indicate if they grew up in foster care, if a
parent was ever arrested or sent to jail or prison, and if a parent had a drug prob-
lem.8 Like grandfather clauses, these questions are grasping at historical designators
to justify the status quo. Proponents act like these designators are objective and
‘evidence-based’, and ignore their own role in persistent inequity.
Third, the two tests are similar because they’re designed for people to fail. The risk
principle is premised on the assumption that people should be incapacitated before
they commit heinous crimes. It seeks to identify high-risk people and lock them up
early. Where poll literacy tests asked questions that were e↵ectively impossible to
answer, risk assessment algorithms direct harsh treatment to people whose actions do
not themselves warrant harsh punishment. By catering interventions to a defendant’s
risk rather than directly to behavior, the theory of incapacitation strips people’s rights
before they’ve had the chance to prove anybody wrong.
The actuarial impulse in criminal punishment - intriguing as it may be - poses a
challenge to our basic commitment to equality under the law. What does this mean
for criminal decisions moving forward?
Resisting prediction in criminal treatment does not mean throwing evidence out
the window. I hope that this paper has exhibited one of the numerous ways that
evidence (and yes, even risk assessment algorithms) can serve a purpose in analyzing
criminal policy decisions and identifying biases. It can even be important for use in
certain cases; for example, increased security at a crowded event might be warranted
8 See COMPAS risk assessment example questions, found at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103-Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-
CORE.html.
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because of an anticipation of violence. But using historical, imperfect indicators to
label people with risk levels, and crafting individualized punishment based on those
designations, can undermine two basic goals of criminal justice - reducing violence
and treating people as equals before the law.
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